Where We Are:
For the last three months, the quick and steady decline in the price of oil has dominated newspaper headlines the world over. Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to cut production, despite resounding pleas from allied and unfavorable nations alike, left crude oil sliding from over $100 USD (where it had hovered for the past two years) to under $50 in a matter of months. Countries with policies banking on expensive oil (like Venezuela, Russia and Iran) felt the sting of dropping prices the most. Companies in other up-and-coming oil producing nations (like the United States, for instance) with similar policies came next. As the price slid, different fields, geographies, and technologies in the oil extraction industry held their breath as their profitability came into question.
Despite being worrisome for a few producers, Saudi’s refusal to curtail production in the face of such pointed requests and vocal media felt like it was going “according to plan”, whatever that plan may be. Statements from princes and ministers abounded on who would do what if the price reached such-and-such a number. Mostly, the message was the same: we are not cutting production, period. Empty rhetoric from heads of state in Iran and Russia demonized the falling prices as a globally detrimental conspiracy. Venezuela all but cursed the Kingdom directly. And still, the Saud’s calmly pumped the price steadily downward.
This price-fall was beneficial for Saudi Arabia directly in two ways.
Firstly, oil at $60 per barrel or less renders much of the United States’ recently discovered production in the shale fields of North Dakota, Texas and elsewhere, economically unfeasible. Lifting cost (or, the final price per barrel a producer must pay to extract it) for these newer fields is much higher, and relies on oil prices remaining high for projects to remain profitable from beginning to end. This will drive down the daily production capacity of the US, which had just passed Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest producer in July of 2014, as well as exploration. Cooling the US oil industry helps Saudi in maintaining their position as the world’s “price-release valve” for a few more years, at least.
Secondly, Saudi benefited from cheaper oil by slashing the budgets available to Iran and Russia for actions in Syria, Yemen, and other areas of interest to the Kingdom. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been known for playing contrasting roles in their surrounding nation’s affairs. By driving the price of oil down directly, Saudi hurts their regional adversary by limiting their financial resources in proxy conflicts around the Middle East.
The lock-step precision and timing in which Saudi Arabia executed the production policy that sustained oil’s slide also seemed to be in concert with American foreign policy. The US exploration of relations with Cuba (and Cuba’s subsequent rejection of Venezuela’s foreign aid in crude), our Congress’ quiet approval of a bill for defense spending in Ukraine while Russia reeled from lost oil revenues, and our government’s relative silence on the Kingdom’s production policies, have all spelled out tacit approval from Washington. Although oil’s slide has hurt some American producers, the lower gasoline prices provided some relief to a weary American consumer, and US foreign policy makers welcomed a reigning in of Russian influence in Eastern Europe.
Where We’re Headed:
On 22 January 2015, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Sa’ud, the sole monarch of Saudi Arabia, died of pneumonia related to a lung infection in an undisclosed hospital just weeks after being admitted. He was immediately succeeded by his eldest half-brother, Salman, age 79, who was serving as the Minister of Defense. The designation of Crown Prince was expectedly passed to Muqrin, currently serving as second deputy prime minister and previously as a ranking member in the Saudi intelligence service.
The passing of Abdullah and Salman’s succession of the world’s largest oil exporter has added uncertainty in the future global oil production. King Salman has already announced a plan to stay the course of maintaining current production; the worry isn’t for imminent policy changes. The uncertainty comes in the future succession of the Kingdom: Salman is nearly 80 and is in poor health, himself. He underwent spinal surgery in 2010, has suffered a stroke, and is rumored to suffer from dementia and possible Alzheimer’s disease. The newly appointed Crown Prince Muqrin is the eldest of the last two able-bodied candidates among Saudi Arabia’s founder’s (Ibn Saud) grandsons. Muqrin is not widely known as an effective leader which leaves only a single candidate (Ahmad, former interior minister) in that generation of aiers to the throne.
After Muqrin and Ahmad (both about 70 years of age), the line of succession falls to the next generation of princes. This generation numbers in the hundreds in a variety of upper-level positions of the current government. Former head of intelligence and brief Ambassador to the US Prince Turki bin Faisal, the eldest son of the late Abdullah, and the sons of King Salman are among possible considerations. How this line of succession would look in the event of a string of royal deaths is still difficult to determine, but Abdullah’s passing was a long-awaited shift that allows these political movements to begin taking shape.
Future key indicators for the situation in the Saudi royal family will include cabinet appointments and shuffling (revealing political preferences of the current reigning King), changes in direction of social policies within the Kingdom (as Abdullah was known as a social reformer, this would be a change from the status-quo), proxy-conflict policy shifts (including Syria, Lebanon, Morroco, Libya, Afghanistan, and Muslim portions of eastern Europe), and direct changes in Saudi oil policy.
